The IAEA and a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

Five nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) have been established over the past few decades, with signatory States undertaking, among other obligations, to not have nuclear weapons in the territory of the applicable NWFZ and to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA (see here). There have also been initiatives to set up a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in the Middle East.

The IAEA has had a role in the context of the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East and the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region.

The IAEA’s General Conference (GC), in its resolutions on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, has called upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking steps to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region; affirmed the need for all States in the region to accept the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards; and mandated the IAEA Director General (DG) to pursue consultations with the States of the region to facilitate the early application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as a necessary step towards the establishment of a NWFZ.

In parallel, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) adopted a resolution calling for “the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems”. During the subsequent NPT Review Conferences, the importance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was reaffirmed, and it was stressed that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.

In 1988, the GC requested DG Hans Blix to prepare a technical study on different modalities for applying safeguards in the Middle East, taking into account the IAEA’s experience in applying safeguards. Mr Blix submitted the technical study to the GC in 1989. It contained descriptions of the safeguards agreements concluded between the IAEA and the States concerned as well as a comparison of the various types of safeguards agreements. In that same year, the GC requested the DG to consult with the States concerned with a view to applying IAEA safeguards to all nuclear installations in the region.

In 1991, the GC adopted its first resolution on the “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” and requested the DG to take the measures necessary to facilitate the early application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and to prepare a model agreement, taking into account the views of the States in the region, as a necessary step towards the creation of a NWFZ.

In 1992, a report by the DG following the 1991 GC resolution identified possible nuclear verification requirements and the means of carrying out such verification in such a zone.

In 2000, the GC requested DG Mohamed ElBaradei to convene a forum where participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions, and, in consultation with States of the region and other interested parties, to develop an agenda and modalities that would help to ensure a successful forum. DG ElBaradei and, from 2009, DG Yukiya Amano continued these activities towards convening a forum and reported annually to the GC on the results.

In November 2011, the IAEA convened a Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The Forum considered the experience of existing NWFZs in creating regional security regimes and achieving disarmament through the establishment of NWFZs. The Chairperson’s summary was annexed to the DG’s report on the Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East issued on 27 August 2012.

Following the 2011 Forum, DG Amano continued his consultations regarding the early application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in the Middle East and encouraged the development and consideration of new ideas and approaches that could help move the IAEA’s mandate forward.

The number and type of safeguards agreements concluded by States in the Middle East (the members of the League of Arab States, as well as Iran and Israel) with the IAEA have evolved. Of the 23 NPT non-nuclear-weapon State Parties of the region, 21 have a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force, 10 of which also have an Additional Protocol in force, which provides the IAEA with broader access to information and locations in each State.

Notwithstanding the continuing broad support for the view that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime would be further strengthened through the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, there continues to be a lack of agreement among States in the region on the substance and modalities of a NWFZ agreement, including on the safeguards obligations they are prepared to undertake.

In September 2021, the GC again adopted a resolution in which, as in previous resolutions, affirmed the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to accept the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear activities. The resolution called upon all States in the region to take measures, including confidence-building and verification measures, aimed at establishing an NWFZ, and also called upon States in the region to extend their fullest cooperation to the DG in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him by the GC.

Since taking office in December 2019, DG Rafael Mariano Grossi has continued, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the GC, to consult and work with the States of the Middle East region to find the common ground required to develop model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ. “It is an important part of the IAEA’s mandate, and I count on the cooperation of all the parties concerned,” he said.